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A dominance structure or competition between a set of players can be mod-
clled by means of a directed graph (N, D). Here, the set of nodes N represents
a set of players, and (i, j) E D means that player i dominates or defeats player
j. We introduce the conservative score mapping which assigna to every digraph
a cooperative game urith transJeraóle utilitiea. Solution concepts for these scote
games can be interpreted as a way to evaluate the underlying dominance struc-
ture or competition, i.e., as a way to rank the players.
We provide characterizations of the score mapping and of the aubclass
of score games. It is shown that a score game is convex, and its core is equal to
the convex hull oC the set of score vectors corresponding to those subgraphs in
which each player that is defeated in the original digraph now is defeated exactly
once. (;onsequently, all marqina! vectors aze such score vectors. However, in
general the converse need not hold, and the class of digraphs for which it dces is
characterized.
Flrrthermore, the Shapley vnlue of a score game, which by definition
is the mean of all marginal vectors, turns out to be also the mean of all score
vectors.
1 Introduction
A situation in which a set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can
be represented by a cooperative game with tmnsferable utilities - or simply a TU-
game - being a pair (N,v) where N denotes the set of players and the characteristic
function v:2N -~ R is such that v(~) - 0. In the sequel we take the set N to be
fixed and therefore represent each TU-game on N by its characteristic function. We
denote the set of all TU-games on N by GN. If we model a cooperative situation in
this way then the players only differ with respect to their contributions to the values
of the vatious coalitions but further they are assumed to be socially symmetric. In
recent literature models have been developed in which the players are part of a social
organization structure which limits the possibilities of coalition formation. In some of
these models this social structure is represented by a graph. As an example we mention
the models in which there are limited communication possibilities between the players
which are represented by an undirected graph. It is assumed that players can only
cooperate if they can communicate with one another. For this we refer to Myerson
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(1977), Owen (L986), I3orm, Owen and 'Iijs (1992), and the survey paper by Borm,
van den Nouweland and 'Tijs (1993). Another approach introducing social asymmetries
between the players can be found in, e.g., Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) and
Faigle and Kern (1993). Here the players are part of some hierarchical organization
which is represented by a directed graph. It is assumed that players can only cooperate
if thcy havc perrnission frorn thcir superiors in the hierarchy.
In all models mentioned above a directed or undirected graph limits the possi-
bilities of coalition formation in a'I'U-game. From a TU-game and a graph another
TU-game is derived taking into account the limited possibilities of cooperation. Of
course, the position of a player in the graph affects his role in the modified game.
In this paper we will derive a TU-game from just a graph. Such a TU-game
can be seen as a socinl power measur~ in the sense that the value of a coalition is a
measure of the importance of the coalition in the social structure represented by the
graph. We concentrate on directed graphs.
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N, D) where N is a finite set of nodes and
D C N x N is a binary relation on N. Such a digraph can represent various hierarchical
organizations. Above we already mentioned the interpretation as a permission structure
in which there are players that need permission from their superiors before they ca.n
cooperate. A digraph also can be interpreted as an exchange economy such that the
nodes represent the agents that participate in the economy and the fact that agent i
dominates agent j means that agent i sets the conditions under which trade between
agent j and himself will take place. (For example, he sets the prices under which
he exchanges commodities with agent j.) This interpretation is considered in van
den Brink and Gille.g (1993). Finally we mention two closely related interpretations
of digraphs that can be found in, e.g., Rubinstein (1980) and Laffont, Laslier and
Le Breton (1993). One is the interpretation of a digraph as a prejerence relation
such that the nodes represent alternatives between which an agent can choose. The
fact that alternative i dominates alternative j then means that an agent or group of
agents prefers í to j when comparing these alternatives pairwise. The other is the
interpretation of a digraph a.R a competition between players or teams. Then the nodes
reprexc~nl. the, players or tearns that participate in the competition and (i, j) E D means
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that player i has won the match he played against player j.
In the sequel we do not want to fix the specific context. The various results are
formulated in a general setting. In section 2 we introduce and axiomatize a specific
mapping that assigns a(convex) TII-game to every digraph on the set N. The games
that can be derived in this way are called conservative score games and form a subclass
of ~N. We provide a characterization of this subclass. It is seen that a conservative
score game is convex and in section 3 we show that the core of such a game coincides
with the convex hull of the se.t of score vectors corresponding to those subgraphs of D
in which each player that is dominated in D is dominated by exactly one other player.
As a consequence all marginal vectors are such score vectors. The class of digraphs for
which the converse also holds is characterized by means of the non-existence of so-called
anti-directed semi-circuits. In section 4 we consider the Shapley value (Shapley (1953))
of a conservative score game and argue that it is equal to the BC-measure which is
introduced in van den Brink and Gilles (1992) as a power measure for digraphs. It is
shown that the Shapley value of a conservative score game, which by definition is the
mean of all marginal vectors, is also the mean of the score vectors that are considered
in section 3.
We conclude this section by presenting some concepts about digraphs that will be used
in the sequel. We only consider finite, irrefiexive digraphs. A digraph (N, D) is finite
if N is finite and it is irreflexive if (i,i) ~ D for every ti E N. We simply refer to
these graphs as digraphs. In the sequel we assume the set N to be fixed and therefore
we represent a digraph by its binary relation. The collection of all digraphs on N is
denoted by DN.
I.et D E DN. For E C N, the nodes in
.S~(E) :- {j E N ~ Lhere is an i E E such that (i, j) E D}
are called the successors of E in D. For node i E N the nodes in
Pp(i) :- {j E N ~(j,i) E D}
are called the pnedecessors of node i in D. (We will often omit the subacript D.)
The score measure on N is the function o: DN ~ RN that assigns to every node
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i in digraph D the number of successors of i. A digraph A is a single predecessor
digmph if ~I'A(i) C l for all i E N. A single predecessor digraph in D E DN is a
single predecessor digraph A C D such that PA(i) ~ 0 if and only if Po(i) ~ 0. The
collection of all single predecessor digraphs in D is denoted by .A~.
2 The conservative score game
In this section we introduce a specific mapping that assigns a cooperative game with
transferablc utilities to every digraph on the set of nodes N. The set of players in such
a TU-game corresponds to the nodes of the digraph while the characteristic function
is given in the following definition.
Definition 2.1 The conservative score mapping on N is the mapping v`: DN ~
CJNgiven by
v`(D)(E) -~{j E S(E) ~ P(j) C E} jor all E C N and D E DN.
For D E DN the game v`(D) is called the conservative scor~e game corresponding to D
and it assigns to every coalition E C N the number of successors of E that have no
predecessors outside E. If we interpret this number as a measure of the importance
of coalition E in the digraph then the conservative score game can be seen as a social
power measure that measures the `dominance power' of coalitions of nodes in a digraph.
Using unanimity games uT, which for every T E 2N `{A} are given by
- r 1 if F, ~T
0 else.ul'(!,) jl
it is easy to see that a conservative score game can be expressed as in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.2 For every D E DN it holds that
v`(D) - ~ u~(;).
iES(N)
5
Example 2.3 Considcr thc digraph D-{(1, 2), (3, 2), (2, 4), ( 3, 4)} on N-{ 1, ..., 4}.
Since P(1) - P(3) - 0, P(2) -{1,3} and P(4) -{2,3} it follows from Lemma 2.2
that v`(D) - 7L(~,3} f T~{2,3}.
From the fact that each conservative score game can be expressed as a positive sum of
unanimity games it follows that the conservative score game corresponding to D E DN
is r,onvex which means that
v`(D)(E) f v`(D)(F) c v`(D)(E U F) -~ v`(D)(E fl F) for all E, F C N.
Next wc give four axioms on a mapping v: DN ---~ GN that uniquely determine the
conservative score mapping. The first axiom states that the value of the grand coalition
N is equal to the total number of dominated nodes in the digraph.
Axiom 2.4 (EfRciency) For every D E DN it holds that
v(D)(N) - ~S(N).
The second axiom states that a node that does not dominate any other node in the
digraph adds the value zero to every coalition in the corresponding game.
Axiom 2.5 (Dummy property) For every D E DN and i E N with S(i) - 0 it
holds that
v(D)(E) - v(D)(E `{i}) jor all E C N.
The third axiom states that a node that dominates all dominated nodes in the digraph
is necessary for any coalition to obtain a non-zero payoff in the corresponding game.
Axiom 2.6 (Top property) For every D E DN and i E N with S(i) - S(N) it holds
thal
v(D)(E) - 0 jor all E C N`{i}.
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The fourth axiom states that if we consider the union of two or more digraphs on the
same set oF nodes which are such that each node is dominated in at most one of these
digraphs then the corresponding game equals the sum of the games corresponding to
Lhc~ cunsLil.ul.ing subdigraplis. lu ordcr to formalizc this idca wc introducc thc following
dofinil.iuns. A prtrtílion of U E DN is a colla.tion P-{DI,..., I)c} of digraphs such
that Lhc, following two coudiLions are saLisficd:
c
~ Uk-1 Dk - Di
~ Dkf1D~-0foralllGk,lCt,k~l.
A partition P of a digraph D is independent if each node is dominated in at most one
digraph in Lhis partition, i.c, if besides the two conditions stated above P also satisfies:
~ ~{AEP~PA(i)~0}GlforalliEN.
Axiom 2.7 (Additivity over independent partitions) For every D E DN and
each independent partition P oj D it holds that
v(D) - ~ v(A).
AE9
1'he four axioms introduced above uniquely determine the conservative score mapping.
Theorem 2.8 A mapping v: DN ~ GN is equal to the conservative score mapping if
and only iJ it satisfies e~ciency, the dummy pnoperty, the top property and additivity
over independent partitions.
PROOF
It can easily be verified that the conservative score mapping satisfies the four axioms.
Now let v: DN -~ CJN satisfy the four axioms and let D E DN.
F'or every j E S(N) we introduce the digraph D~ E DN where
I)~ :- {(i, j) E D ~ i E P(j)}.
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From efficiency of v it follows that v(D~)(N) - 1. Let E C N.
[f E~ P(j) then SD,(i) - Q for every i E N`E. The dummy property then implies
that v(D~)(E) - v(D~)(N) - 1.
Otherwise, if E~ P(j), then P(j)fl (N`E) ~ 0. Since Sp,(i) -{j} - SD,(N) for all
i E P(j) n(N `F,), the t.op property implies that v(D~)(E) - 0.
'1'he collection {D~}jES~N) is an independent partition of D. h'rom additivity over
independent partitions it then follows that
v(D)(E) -~ v(D~)(G) -~{j E S(E) ~ P(j) C E} - v`(D)(E) for all E C N.
iE5(N)
The conservative score mapping assigns a TU-game to every digraph on N. However,
not every TLJ-game can be the consetvative score game corresponding to some digraph.
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a TU-game
to be the conservative score game corresponding to some digraph.
Proposition 2.9 l,et v E ~N. Then v is a conservative score game ij and only if
lhere exists a sequence T-(Tl, .. .,Ti) of coalitions, and a sequence Z- (il, ..., it) of
players such that the Jollowing three conditions are satisfied:
(i) :k E N`Tk jor all k E{1,... , t};
(ii) ik ~ i~ for all k,I E {1,...,t}, k~ 1;




Suppose that v is the conservative score game corresponding to D E DN. According
to I,emma `l.`l it holds that v-~~ES(N) uP(;).
Let S(N) -{s~,...,st}. Taking T-(P(s~),...,P(si)) and Z-(s~,...,st), the
conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied.
If
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Let T - (7'i, . . . , Ti) and Z - (i~, . . . , ii) satisfy conditions ( i), (ii) and (iii).
Let D E DN be given by D - ~J,`E-r Dk where Dk :- {(j,ik) ~ j E Tk} for every k E
{ 1, ..., t}. Then it readily follows that v is the conservative score game corresponding
to D.
'I'hus Proposition 2.9 characterizes the class of all conservative score games on N. An
alternative to the r.onservative score mapping ís the (optimisticJ score mapping' which
is the mapping v': DN --~ GN given by
v'(D)(F.) -~S(E) for every E C N and D E DN.
Thus the (optimistic) score game corresponding to D E DN assigns to every coalition
E C N the total number of successors oí E, irrespective of the fact whether these
successors have predecessors outside E or not. Thus this game can be seen as a gen-
eralization of the score measure that is given in section 1. For every D E DN the
corresponding (optimistic) score game is the dual game of the corresponding conserva-
tive score game.
Lemma 2.10 For every D E DN il holds that
v`(D)(N) - v`(D)(N `E) - v'(D)(E) for all E C N.
PROOF
Let 1) E DN and E C N. Then
v`(D)(N) - v`(D)(N `E) -~{j E S(N) ~ P(j) C N}
-~{j E S(N `E) ~ P(j) C N`E}
-~S(N) -~{j E S(N) ~ P(j) n E- 0}
-~{j E S(N) ~ P(j) n E~ 0} -~S(E) - v'(D)(E).




'Che optimistic score mappiug can bc axiomatized by replacing the top property in
Theorem 2.8 by a dua( top pmperty which states that for every D E DN and i E N
with 5(i) - .S(N) it holds that v(D)(E) - v(D)(N) for all E 3 i.
Example 2.11 In this example we illustrate the independence of the four axioms
stated in Theorem 2.8.
l. Let the mapping v': DN -~ C'jNbe given by
v'(D)(F,) - 2. v`(D)(E) for all E C N and D E DN.
'I'his mapping sal,isfies all four axiorns except efficiency. For the digraph of Ex-
ample '2.3 it holds that v'(D)(N) -] e 2- ~S(N).
2. Let the mapping v2: DN ~ C~N be given by
v~(D)(E)-~{jES(E)~(P(j)U{j})CE}forallECNandDEDN.
This mapping satisfies all four axioms except the dummy property. For the
digraph of Example 2.3 it holds that v~(D)({2,3}) - 0 and v2(D)({2,3,4}) - 1
although S(4) - 0.
3. Consider the score mapping v': DN ---~ GN that is discussed above. This mapping
satisfics all four axioms except thc top property. For the digraph of Example 2.3
it holds that v'(U)({1}) - 1 although S(3) -{2,4} - S(N).
4. Let the mapping v3: DN -~ GN for every E C N and D E DN be given by
v3(D)(E) -~{j E S(E) U S(S(E)) ~ P(j) U P(P(j)) C E}.
This mapping satisfies all four axioms except additivity over independent parti-
tions. The two digraphs Dl -{(1,2),(3,2)} and D~ -{(2,4),(3,4)} form an
independent partition of the dígraph D of Example 2.3. However,
v3(D')({2,3}) f v3(D')({2,3}) - 0 f 1~ 0- v3(D)({2,3}).
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3 The core of a conservative score game
In this section we consider the core of a conservative score game. The core of an
arbitrary "I~ll-gamc v E QN is given by
~iEN x; - v(N)
Corc(v) - x E RN and
~iEF. xi ? v(E) for all E C N
As stated in the previous section each conservative score game is convex. In Shap-
ley (1971) it is shown that the core of a convex game v corresponds to the convex
hull of the marginal vectors, {mx(v)}xEnlNl, where II(N) denotes the collection of all
permutations on N and for every a E lI(N) and v E tiN, m~(v) E RN is given by:
m'(v) - v({j E N ~ a(j) C a(i)}) - v({j E N ~ ir(j) G a(i)}) for all i E N. (1)
Using this result we can characterize the core of a conservative score game. For every
D E DN we define
M(D) -{m~(v`(D)) E RN ~ a E lI(N)},
being the collection of all marginal vectors of the conservative score game corresponding
to D, and
E(D) -{{v(A) E RN ~ A E.Ao},
being the collection of score measures of all single predecessor digraphs in D.
Theorem 3.1 !'or every D E DN it holds that
Core(v`(D)) - Conv(E(D)).
PROOF
Let D E DN. The proof of the theorem consists of the following steps.
(a) We first prove that M(D) C E(D) by showing that for every rr E]I(N) there is
an A E Ao such that mx(v`(D)) - o(A). Therefore let a E lI(N). Then
11
rn; (v`(D)) -~{j E SD(i) ~ a(h) c a(i) for all h E P~(j)} for all i E N.
Li-I. il E'PN bi, Rivi,n by il -{(:, J) E I) ~ a(h) C rr(i) for all h E Pr~(j)}.
Sin~c ,1 (.: I) aud Pn(J) -{i E Pp(7) ~ a(i) 1 a(h) for all la E Pr~(7)} it is casy
to si~e that A E Ap and Q(A) - m~(v`(U)).
(b) Next we prove that E(U) C Core(v`(D)) by showing that a(A) E Core(v`(D))
for all ~1 ~,A~,. 'I'h~~r~dun~ lot. ~l E ,A~~.
liy definition of a single predecessor digraph it holda that
~ a;(A) - ~S~(N) - v`(D)(N).
~EN
Further, ~;E~o;(A) -~{j E So(E) ~ PA(j) n E~ 0} 1
Po(j) C E} - v`(D)(E) for all E C N.
~i~l~~~ti r,(n) E ~~~,,.,,(11`(n)).
~{j E SD(E) ~
Thus we liave proved that
M(U) C E(D) C Core(v`(D)). (2)
Since v`(D) is convex it holds that Core(v`(D)) - Conv(M(D)). With (2) it then
follows that Core(v`(D)) - Conv(E(D)).
L]
Note that the number of permutations of the players in N is equal to ~II(N) - (~N)!,
while the number of single predecessor digraphs in digraph D is equal to ~.40 -
jj;ES(Nl ~P(i). Therefore, for many digraphs the number of single predecesor digraphs
will be less than the number of permutations of N. However, this does not hold for all
digraphs as can easily be seen by considering the complete digraph D- N x N.
Example 3.2 Reconsider the digraph D and corresponding conservative score game
v of Examplc 2.3.




Figure 1: The core of v of Example 3.2
A, - {(1,2),(2,4)}, A2 - {(1,2)(3,4)}, A3 - {(3,2),(2,4)}, A, - {(3,2),(3,4)}.
The corresponding score measures are:
a(n,) - (l, l,o,o), rr(A2) - (l,o, l,o), ~(A3) - (o, l, l,o), a(A,) - (0,0,2,0).
The core of v is represented by the shaded area in Figure 1. Note that the vectors
o(A;), A; E.Ao, are precisely the extreme points of the core.
According to relation (2) in the proof o[ T'heorem 3.1 each extreme point of the core of
a conservative score game corresponds to the score measure of a single predecessor di-
graph in ihe c~.orresponding digraph. In I?xamplc 3.2 the converse also holds. However,
this is not always the case as the following example shows.
Example 3.3 Consider the digraph D-{(1,2),(1,5),(2,4),(2,5),(3,2),(3,4)} on
N-{1,...,5} as represented in Figure 2.
This digraph has S single predecessor digraphs which are given by
- o(A9)
o(A3)
A~ - {(1,2),(1,5),(2,4)}, Az - {(1,2),(1,5),(3,4)}, A3 - {(1,2),(2,5),(2,4)},
A,, - {(1,2),(2,5),(3,4)}, As - {(3,2),(1,5),(2,4)}, Ae - {(3,2),(1,5),(3,4)},
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Figure 2: Digraph D of Example 3.3
A~ - {(3,2),(2,5),(2,4)}, and As - {(3,2),(2,5),(3,4)},
with score measures
o(A~) -(2, 1,0,0,0), v(Az) -(2,0, 1,0,0), o(A3) -(1,2,0,0,0),
o(.A4) -(1,1,1, o, o), a(AS) -(1,1, 1, o, o), o(Ae) - (1, o, 2, o, o),
o(A~) - (0, 2,1, 0, 0), and Q(As) -( 0, 1, 2,0, 0).
According to Lemma 2.2 the corresponding conservative score game is given by v-
u{i,z} f u{i,3} t u{z,s}. Thus
M(D) - {(2, 1, 0, 0, 0), (2, 0, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 2, 0, 0), (1, 2, 0, 0, 0), (0, 2,1, 0, 0), (0,1, 2, 0, 0)}.
The core of v and the score measures of the single predecessor digraphs in D are
illustrated in Figure 3. (The cote corresponds to the shaded area in the figure.)
Consider the score measure o(.49) - o(AS) -(1,1, 1, 0, 0). This score measure doea
not correspond to a marginal vector of v. The intuition behind this is as follows. Each
pair of the players 1, 2 and 3 has a different successor in common. Therefore in any
permutation of the players the marginal contribution of the first of the three players
1, 2 or 3, to enter is eyual to 0, of the second to enter is equal to 1, and of the third to
enter is equal to 2. 'I'hus there is no permutation in which the marginal contribution





Figure 3: The core of v of Example 3.3
a(Ar) a(As)
Next we will characterize the class of digraphs D for which the set E(D) of score mea-
sures of all single predecessor digraphs coincides with the set M(D) of marginal vectors
of the corresponding conservative score gamc. For this we introduce the following con-
cept.
Definition 3.4 Let D E DN. A sequence of nodes (il,jl,i2,j2,...,is,jr), t 1 2, is an
anti-directed semi-circuit in D if the following conditions are satis,fied
(i) ik ~ ir and jk ~ ji for all k,! E{1,...,t} with k~ l;
(~~) 7k E S(xk) f1 .S(2k~r) for all k E {l, .. . , t- 1} and jr E S(ii) fl S(tr).
Thus an anti-directed semi-circuit in a digraph D is a cycle such that the neighbours
of each node i in the cycle are either both successors or both predecessors of i and,
moreover, each node appears at most once as a successor and at most once as a pre-
decessor in this cycle. In the digraph of Example 3.3 the sequence ( 1, 2, 3, 4, 2, 5) is an
anti-din.r.ted semi-circuit. (n the digraph of l;xamples 2.3 and 3.2 there does not exist
an anti-directed semi-circuit.
Theorem 3.5 Let D E DN. Then
E(D) - M(D) if and only if there is no anti-directed semi-circuit in D.
'1'he proof o( this thiYircm can be found in the appendix and is rnore or less based on
the reasoning as given in Example 3.3.
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4 The Shapley value of a conservative score game
In I his .c~ct.iun wc runsidcr Lhc 5haplc~y vxluc of a consc~rvativc scorc gatne. I3y de(inition
Lhc~ Shaplc~v valuc is t.6c~ Gtncl.ion ,4lt:GN -~ IiN whic~h assigns to cach '1'll-garnc thc
avc~ragc uf thc~ ntarginal vec~ton of that. garnc. In particular, for cvcry U E DN it holds
that
Sh;(v`(D)) - 1 ~ m; for all i E N. (3)
~M(D) ,REM(D)
A power measure for digraphs is a function f: DN -i RN that assigns a real number to
each node of a digraph which can be seen as a measure of the `dominance power' of that
node in the digraph. 'l'he score measure can be seen as such a power measure. Another
powcr rncati[ue, int.roduccd in van den Brink and Gilles (1992), is the BC-measune
~i: DN --r ItN, which is given by
~i;(D) -~~~(~) for all i E N and D E DN. (4)
)E.S(i)
In section `L we argued t.hat, the conservative score mapping assigns to every digraph a
'I'U-ganur w hich c~an bc, sa~n rLV a social power mea.gure that rneasures the dominance
power oC cualitions of nodes in the underlying digraph. Since the Shapley value assigns
real numbers to all players in a TU-game, the Shapley value as expressed in equation
(3) can be seen as a power measure for digraph D. It turns out that the Shapley value
of a conservative score game is equal to the BG-measure of the underlying digraph.
Moreover, tt[is Shapley value, which by convexity of the game is the barycenter of the
core (Shapley ( 1971)), is equal to the average of the score vectors corresponding to
the single predecessor digraphs in the digraph. This is a rather surprising result since
Example 3.3 shows that this set of score vectors may contain the extreme points of the
core as a strict subset.
Theorem 4.1 Let D E DN. Then Sh(v`(D)) - Q(D) and




Let D E DN. According to Lemma 2.10 the conservative score game v`(D) is the
dual of the score game v'(D). In van den Brink and Gilles (1992) it is shown that
Sh(v'(D)) -(i(D). Since the Shapley value of a TU-game is equal to the Shapley
value of its dual game it holds that Sh(v`(D)) - Q(D).
I'or every (i, j) E D we define .Ap(i, j) :- {A E Ap ~ j E SA(i)}, beíng the collection
of single predecessor digraphs in D in which i is the ( unique) predecessor of j.
Then ~.ilp(t, j) - jjhES(,v)`{j) ~P(h). Since ~Ap - r[hES(N) ~P(h) it then holds
thatt
1 1
ai(D) - ~ ~{~, P - ~y A ~ ~Ap(i,j) -
JESp(i) m ( ~) m p jESD(,)
- 1 ~ ~ 1 - 1 ~ ~ 1 - 1 ~ o;(A).
~Ap iESp(i) AEAn(i,j) ~~p AEAp jES~(i) ~Ap AE.~p
Example 4.2 Consider the digraph D of Example 3.3. For this digraph it holds that
Sh(v`(D)) - Q(D) -(1, 1,1,0,0). Taking the average of the marginal vectors over all
permutations of the players yields
„o (1,1,1, o, o),
(zo(a, l, o, o, o) t ao(2, o, l, o, o) ~ ao(1, o, a, o, o)
tao(1, 2, o, o, o) t ao(o, 2, l,o, o) f zo(o, l, a, o, o)
while taking the average of the score measures of all single predecessor digraphs in D
yields
(2,1, o,o, o) t(a, o, l, o, o) f(1, o, a, o,o) t(1,1,1, o, o)
e - (l,l,i,o,o).
-~(l, l, l,o,o) t(l,a,o,o,o) ~(o,a, l,o,o) f(o, l,z,o,o)
tThis part is aimilar to the proof that the BG-measure of an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected
digraph D is equal to the average of the score measures over all single predecessor digrapha in D as
shown in van den Brink and Gilles (1993).
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'I'herc arc various axiomatizations of the Shapley value for arbitrary TU-games. One of
these axiomatizations uses the efficiency, dummy player, necessary player and additivity
axiorns. A function f:C~N --. R~` is e(jicient if ~;EN f;(v) - v(N) for all v E~~`. It
satisfits the dummy player property if f;(v) - 0 for all i E N and v E~N with
v(E) - v(E ` {i}) for all F, C N. It satisfies the necessary player property if for
all monotone gamest v and i E N such that v(E) - 0 for all E C N`{i} it holds
that f;(v) ~ fj(v) for all j E N. It is additive if for all v,w E~N it holds that
f(v) t f(w) - f(v ~ w), whcrc (v f w)(L') - v(E) ~ w(E) (or all E C N. In order
to axiomatize the Shapley value restricted to the class of conservative score games we
need to adapt the additivity axíom since for two conservative score games v and w the
sum game (v t w) need not to be a conservative score game as the following example
shows.
Example 4.3 Let N-{ 1, 2, 3}, v- u{i} f u{r,s}, and w- u{i,a}. The (unique)
digraphs underlying these conservative score games are
D' - {(1,2),(1,3),(2,3)} and D~ - {(1,2),(3,2)}.
Using Proposition 2.9 it can be seen that no digraph can be constructed that underlies
the sum game (v -} w) - u{i} f u{i,x} ~- u{i,s}.
We say that a function f:GN -i RN is additive on a specific subclass ~ of ~N if for
every pair of games v, w E~ such that the sum game (v -f w) is also an element of G
it holds that f(v -}- w) - f(v) t f(w). Now the Shapley value restricted to the clasa of
conservative score games can be axiomatized by the efficiency, dummy and necessary
player axioms and additivity restricted to the class of conservative score games. (This
can be seen by noting that each unanimity game, except the unanimity game on N,
is a conservative score game and each conservative score game can be expresscd as in
Lemma 2.2.)
As stated in Theorem 4.1, the BG-measure of a digraph D is equal to the Shapley value
of the conscrvative score game v`(D). It is interesting to note that by combining the set
lA '1'U-game v is monotone if v(E) C v(F) for all E C F C N.
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of axioms that characterize the conservative score mapping and the set of axioms that
characterize the Shapley value restricted to the class of conservative score games one
obtains a set of axioms Lhat uniquely determine the BG-measure as a power measure
J: DN -~ OtN. hor cxample, the dummy node properties of the conservative score
mapping and the Shapley value, respectively, state that a node that does not dominate
any other node in a digraph is a dummy player in the corresponding game, and that the
Shaplcy valuc of a durnmy player in a game is equal to 0. Combining these two axioms
yields the dummy node property of the BG-measure which states that the BG-measure
of a node Lhat does not dominate any other node is equal to 0. Similarly, combining
the other three properties yield the corresponding properties for the BG-measure. As
can be derived from van den Brink and Gilles (1992) these four properties characterize
the BG-measure.
Appendix
Before proving Theorem 3.5 we introduce the following.
An anti-directed semi-circuit (il, jr, . .. , ic, jr) is minimal in D if there is no anti-
directed semi-circuit (hr,gl,...,h„g,) in D such that {hl,...,h,} C{il,...,ir}.
PROOF OF TIiEOREM 3.5
Let D E DN. Since M(D) C E(D) ( as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.1) we have to
prove that E(D) C M(D) if and only if there is no anti-directed semi-circuit in D.
Only if
Suppose there is an anti-directed semi-circuit in D. Then there is a minimal anti-
directed semi-circuit (il, jr, .. ., ir, jr) in D.
I.et I - {ir,...,ir} and J - {jl,...,jr}.
We distinguish the following two cases with rc~pect to ~I.
I. Supposc that ~1 - 2, i.e., I- {ii,iz}.
'I'hen we can construct an il E A~~ that satisfies the following conditions:
~~) t'n(7r) - i~ and PA(7z) - iz;
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(ii) PA(h) C Po(h) fl 1 for all h E S(I) `J.
Since j, ~ S(i~) ` .S(iz) and jz ~ S(iz) ` .S(i2) it holds that
~~~(A) ? i~[~5~(2i) `S(2x)] f I and a;zÍA) ?~[S(2z) `S(2i)] f l.
I.et n E Il(N). We may assume without loss of generality. that x(i2) G ~r(iz).
Then m~(v`(D)) G ~[S(i2) `S(iz)] G~[S(il) `S(iz)] -}- 1.
Hence, there is no ~r E H(N) such that v(A) - mx(v`(D)).
2. Suppose that ~1 ~ 2.
(a) Let h E .S(I) ` J. We first prove that ~[P(h) fl I] - 1.
Since h E S(I) it holds that ~[P(h) fl I] ~ 1.
Suppose that ~[P(h) fl I] ~ 1. Then there exist k, l E{1, ..., t} with
k G 1 and {ik, i~} C P(h). We may assume without loss of generality. that
k-1.
If 1 G t then (i~, jl, ... , i~, j~) is an anti-directed semi-circuit in D with
{il,...,i~} C I and {i2i...,i~} ~ I.
If 1- t then ( i2i j~,it, ji) is an anti-directed semi-circuit in D with
{i2,ii} C I and {i2,i~} ~ I (since by assumption ~I 1 2).
Both cases are in contradiction with (i2f jl, ..., ii, js) being a minimal anti-
directed semi-circuit in D.
(b) Using (a) we can construct an A E AD that satiafies the following condi-
tions:
(i) PA(jk) -{ik} for all k E {1,...t};
(ii) PA(h) - Po(h) fl I for all h E S(I) `J.
(c) Next we prove that o(A) ~ M(D).
Since .SA(ik) - Sn(2k) `{~k-~} for all k E {2,...,t} and
.SA(i2) - SD(i~) ` {j,}, it holds that
zo
a;(A) -~Sp(i) - l for all i E 1. (5)
Let ~r E II(N) and let i E I be such that ~r(i) G~r(h) for all h E I. Then
{j E Sp(i) I Pp(j) C {h E N ~~r(h) C a(i)}} n J- 0.
But then
m; (v`(D)) -~{j E Sp(i) ~ Pp(j) C {h E N ~ ~r(h) G ~r(i)}} C~Sp(i) - 2.
Hence there is no a E II(N) such that a(A) - mx(v`(D)).
'I'hus we have proved that if there is an anti-directed semi-circuit in D then
r(p) ~ M(D),
If
Suppose there is no anti-directed semi-circuit in D, and let A E Ap. We show that
therc is a n E II(N) such that a(A) - mx(v`(D)).




Lk :- i E N` U L~
t-o
I~or every j E SA(i) it holds that l for all k E N.
Pp(j) C Uió Lr U {i} 1
(b) Let k E N be such that N `~J~ó L~ ~~. We prove that Lk ~ 0.
On the contrary suppose that Lk - 0. Let N:- N`(Jió Lj. Then for every
i E N there is a j E SA(i) such that Pp(j) ~ ~J~ó L~ U{i} and thus
(Pp(j) n N] `{i} ~ 0.
Let n" -~N. We can construct a sequence ( i~,j~,iz,ja,...) satisfying the
following conditions:
(i) i~ E N;
(ii) jk E Sq(ik) and ík~~ E [Pp(jk) n N] ~{ik} for every k E{1,...n}.
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Since N is finite there are k, l E{ 1, ..., n-~ 1} with k c!, ik - i~ and all players
in {ik,...,i~-1} different.
By construction it holds that j~ ~ j, for all r, s E{k, . ..,1 - 1}.
But then ( ik, jk,...,ii-~, j~-i) is an anti-directed semi-circuit in D.
(c) From (a) and (b) it follows that there is an m E N such that
(i) Lk ~ 0 for all k E{1,...,m};
(ii) Lk fl L; - 0 for all k, l E {1, ..., m} with k~ l;
(iii) Uk i Lk - N,
i.e., the sets LI, ..., Lm form a partition of N consisting of non-empty sets only.
(d) Let a E II(N) be such that if i E Lk and j E L~ with k c 1 then A(i) C~r(j).
We show that m~(v`(D)) - Q(A).
Let i E Lk for some 1 C k C m. From (a) it follows that
(i) 1[ j E SA(i) then PD(j) C ~J~ó L~ U{i};
(ii) If j E Sp(i) ` SA(i) and SA(h) - {j} then h E ~Ji k}1L~ and thus
1'n(J) ~ Uiti L~ U {i}.
But then
m; (v`(D)) -~{j E SD(i) ~ rr(h) G a(i) for all h E PD(j)}
- ~ ~7 E SD(z)
k-I l
Po(j) C U Li U {i} j- o;(A).
t-o JJJ
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